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11.0 Introduction
The functional locus of innovation, the variable modeled in this
paper, provides a valuable empirical tool via which innovation
researchers, practitioners, and policymakers can increase their ability
to understand and manage the innovation process. Data on the variable
itself have proven useful to practitioners and policymakers over the
last few years because empirical determination of who innovates in a
given industry has clear relevance to practice and policy. (For a brief
I define the "functional locus of innovation" as the location in which
costs are incurred (and usually, the work performed) that are involved
in the creation of an innovation. In turn, that "locus", an
organization and/or individual, is classified in terms of the
functional relationship which it holds to the innovation at issue.
Thus, if one is studying a sample of innovations impacting process
machinery employed in a given industry, firms which use that machinery
in production would be grouped in terms of that functional
relationship into a "user" category, firms which manufacture that
process machinery grouped into a "manufacturer" category, etc.
2discussion of this point see .) The value of the variable to
researchers, however, will only be realized as it is incorporated into
innovation process models such as the one presented here.
The functional locus of innovation variable, first empirically
explored by Peck (1), is a valuable research tool for innovation
researchers because it combines two important characteristics. First,
it correlates strongly with dependent variables, such as frequency of
successful innovation, which are much used in innovation process
research. Second, it lends itself well to reliable empirical
measurement.
With regard to strong correlations with variables of interest in
innovation research, commercially successful innovations have, for
example, proven strongly associated with different functional loci as a
function of innovation "type", time, and, recently product design.
Empirical data on the functional locus of innovation establish the
functional type of firm which typically is the source of the new
products and processes in an industry. This information is important
to innovation practitioners because it allows any given firm to
understand its usual·role in the innovation process. Thus, a firm can
address such questions as: "In the X line of process equipment which
we manufacture can we expect the equipment user to innovate for us --
or do we do it ourselves?" This understanding in turn has a major
impact on how the firm may best staff and organize innovation-related
departments such as R&D and marketing research. (For an expanded
discussion see von Hippel [23.) Empirical data on the functional
locus of innovation are also important to policymakers because,
clearly, knowing who innovates is an essential first step to the
development of effective innovation policy. Thus, policymakers in
possession of this data can more effectively consider questions
important to national policy such as: "If we want to increase the
productivity and world-competitiveness of industry Y by encouraging
the development of more productive processing machinery, which
potential innovators should we focus our incentives on? machine
users? machine manufacturers? material suppliers?" (For discussion
and examples of the impact which functional locus of innovation
considerations can have on innovation policymaking, see Finkelstein
and von Hippel [3].)
3Thus, with regard to innovation type, vn Hippel has found innovative
users to have been the locus of 67% of 49 innovations sampled in
semiconductor and electronic subassembly process machinery (4) and the
source of 80% of 114 scientific instrument innovations sampled (5)
while, in sharp contrast, innovation manufacturers have been found by
Berger (6) to be the locus of 100% of six innovations sampled in the
field of engineering polymers and by Boyden (7) to be responsible for
100% of sixteen sampled polymer additive innovations. Major shifts in
the locus of innovation over time have been shown in fields such as
computer hardware where Knight (8) examined 143 models of computer
embodying "functional improvements" and documented a shift in the 1944
to 1962 period from close to 100% user innovation to close to 100%
manufacturer innovation. Also, major differences in the locus of
innovation as a function of equipment design were recently shown by von
Hippel and Finkelstein (9) in the field of automated clinical chemistry
analysis where they found that users developed 70% of 20 test protocols
used on one type of equipment and 0% of 18 protocols used on another.
Since the innovation process is carried out in a "noisy"
environment, a variable must exhibit a strong signal and be reliably
measurable to be a useful research tool. Empirical innovation research
has amply demonstrated that signals as strong as the findings outlined
above can seldom be found via other reliably measurable variables
related to the innovation process such as R&D expenditures or patent
counts. And, unhappily, variables which have been seen as providing
significant signals such as "need push" vs. "technology pull" have been
found difficult to define and measure upon close examination (10). The
functional locus of innovation variable would be similarly vitiated were
4it not for its susceptibility to reliable empirical retrospective
measurement. (Empirical research on the innovation process is usually
retrospective since the innovation process moves slowly. A measure's
reliability in retrospective data collection work is therefore
important.) If, as has been detailed elsewhere (4, 5), proper care is
used in sample selection and data collection, the functional locus of
innovation is a highly reliable retrospective measure simply because
those who incur the work and/or cost of an innovation (that is, are the
locus of innovation) typically generate extensive contemporaneous
documentation, such as the hardware itself, related blueprints,
accounting data, and articles. Variables such as the source of the
innovation "idea" typically lack similar data richness and thus cause
innovation researchers great difficulty due to the well-established
unreliability of unaided recall by interviewees (11).
1.1 Structure of the Paper
In the present paper, I begin the work of modeling the functional
locus of innovation by focusing on the effect of one factor only -- the
degree to which different functional categories of would-be innovators
are able to appropriate innovation benefit. In Section 2 I hypothesize
that the functional locus of innovation can be effectively modeled in
terms of appropriability of innovation benefit if and as three
conditions hold in the real world, namely, would-be innovators: (1) are
not able to capture diffusion-of-knowledge benefit arising from their
innovations; (2) are able to capture output-embodied benefit arising
Appropriability of innovation benefit is an issue of interest and
concern to many students of the innovation process. Readers not
familiar with it will be interested in key papers by Arrow (12),
Mansfield (13), Nelson (14), and Pakes (15).
5from their innovations; and (3) differ significantly in their ability to
capture output-embodied innovation benefit. In Section 3 I examine the
two extant mechanisms which an innovator can, in principle, use to
capture diffusion-of-knowledge benefit, namely, patent and trade secret
legislation. I conclude that would-be innovators are not able to
capture diffusion-of-knowledge benefit effectively in most industries
via patents and trade secrets, and that therefore the first condition of
the "functional locus model" is in fact satisfied in most industries.
In Section 4 I discuss the two levels of quasi-monopoly -- industry
level and firm level -- which an innovating firm might hope to establish
in order to capture output-embodied innovation benefit. The germane
mechanisms for establishing these are barriers to entry at the industry
level and patents, trade secrets, and lead time at the level of the
innovating firm. Except in the instance of the patent mechanism --
found ineffective -- empirical data and tests of reason suggest that
these mechanisms do have real-world effectiveness and t at the second
model condition is therefore satisfied in many industries. Finally, in
Section 5, I consider the third condition which must be met if one is to
be able to predict the functional locus of innovation in terms of the
appropriability of innovation benefit variable, that is, the presence of
a significant difference in the ability of would-be innovators to
capture output-embodied innovation benefit. While, clearly, a
difference in the ability of would-be innovators to capture
output-embodied innovation benefit must be substantial if one is to be
able to predict the locus of innovation in terms of this single
variable, I show empirically that a difference of the requisite
magnitude is present in at least one category of process machinery
6innovation ("pultrusion" machinery) and offer tests of reason which
indicate that it must be present in many others, thus demonstrating the
third condition satisfied in some industries.
In this paper, then, I present a single-factor model of the
functional locus of innovation, describe the conditions under which it
can function, and demonstrate by example and test of reason that it does
function when and as these prescribed conditions hold. In future work
I will seek to extend the model and related understanding of the
innovation process via the inclusion of additional variables which the
research of others and myself will suggest.
2.0 The Ability to Predict the Functional Locus of Innovation as a
Function of the Appropriability of Innovation-Related Benefit
The economic benefits which an innovator might obtain from his
innovation can be segregated into two mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive categories: (1) "output-embodied benefit" and (2)
"diffusion-of-knowledge benefit". Output-embodied benefit is obtained
by an innovator via in-house use of his innovation in his product and/or
process and the consequent embodiment of its value in the output of his
firm. Diffusion-of-knowledge benefit is obtained by an innovator from
the sale or licensing of unembodied knowledge regarding his innovation
to others. Let us then consider whether we should logically expect to
be able to predict the functional locus of innovation -- that is, the
functional relationship of innovator to innovation -- under each of two
For germane current research on other candidate variables see, for
example, Roberts' examination of "critical functions" (16), Abernathy
and Utterback's examination of "fluid and specific" firms (17), and
Nelson's examination of "natural trajectories" (18).
7extreme cases regarding the ability of an innovator to capture benefit
from his innovation:
Case 1: Total ability to capture output-embodied benefit and
total ability to capture diffusion-of-knowledge
benefit.
Case 2: Total ability to capture output-embodied benefit but no
or only an imperfect ability to capture diffusion-of-
knowledge benefit.
2.1 Predictions Regarding Functional Locus of Innovation Under Case 1
Conditions
If we assume that an innovator has "perfect", costlessly enforceable
property rights to his innovation, i.e., if, without cost to himself, he
can totally control its diffusion and capture benefit from innovation
users, manufacturers, and others to the point where adoption becomes a
matter of indifference to them, then the benefits capturable by an
innovator would be the same no matter what his own functional
relationship to the innovation at issue. Thus, under Case 1 conditions,
we can make no prediction regarding the functional locus of innovation on
the basis of appropriability of benefit considerations.
The reasoning behind the above conclusion is that costless
* If the above-described inability to predict the locus of innovation
under Case 1 conditions is to hold, costless enforcement of property
rights is required for the following reason: Since marketing of an
innovation and enforcement of payment can be reasonably assumed to be
costless for an innovating firm when it captures output-embodied
benefit by utilizing the innovation knowledge in its own processes
and/or products, non-costless marketing of and enforcement of payments
for use of innovation knowledge by other firms would create a
differential between benefit attainable from in-house and external use
of the innovation and generate a preference for the former. This in
turn would allow an incremental benefit from the same innovation to
accrue to those innovators with a larger in-house use for it--and
create a differential incentive to innovate as a function of locus of
innovation.
8enforcement of property rights would allow any innovator to set the fees
charged to each innovation beneficiary, and each class of beneficiaries,
so as to attain the maximum return. The role which the innovator himself
happens to play with regard to the innovation -- user, manufacturer, etc.
-- does not influence his fee setting decision because he is equally able
to capture innovation returns from his own company and other companies.
This being so, he has no incentive to concentrate benefits in his own
company even if the direct return from the particular innovation can be
"leveraged" by its user to create larger "other returns" over time.
2.2 Predictions Regarding the Functional Locus of Innovation Under Case
2 Conditions
Under Case 2 conditions we assume that: (1) the innovator has
temporary monopoly power over the innovation information embodied in his
output and thus is able to capture significant output-embodied benefit
arising from his innovation; and (2) the innovator has no or only a very
imperfect ability to capture diffusion-of-knowledge benefit. Faced with
this situation, the economically rational firm, seeking to maximize its
Suppose, for example, that a minor cost-reducing process innovation
were made available to one of several manufacturers of a commodity
with previously equal manufacturing costs, financial resources, etc.
If further innovations or other changes did not intervene, the
commodity producer benefiting from the innovation could in principle
increase his market share as a consequence of innovation and thus
"leverage" the direct benefits of the innovation, perhaps manyfold.
But note that, even under such a set of circumstances, the innovator
has no incentive to prefer to increase or decrease the market share
of his own company relative to that Qf his competitors because he
can, given perfect information, also charge the benefiting company
for such second (and nth) order benefits arising from the innovation
up to the point of indifference.
9joint return from output-embodied benefit and diffusion-of-knowledge
benefit, would wish to move to a greater reliance on embodying its
knowledge in output. If firms differ in their ability to embody
innovation knowledge in their output, they will also clearly differ in
their ability to benefit from a given innovation and therefore in their
economically rational willingness to invest the resources required to
innovate. This, in turn, will allow us to predict the unctional locus
of innovation when and if the differences in ability to appropriate
output-embodied innovation benefit are large enough to be observable
under real-world conditions.
Whether or not and to what degree these conditions do in fact
accurately describe the real world is an empirical matter which I will
take up in the following sections of this paper. A simple example of
the predictive power regarding the locus of innovation which we will
acquire where these conditions do hold, however, can be seen in the
following: Given Case 2 conditions, an independent inventor is much
less likely to invent than are would-be innovators with other functional
relationships to the innovation opportunity -- because an independent
inventor has only unembodied knowledge to sell.
3.0 Real-World Appropriability of Diffusion-of-Knowledge Benefit by
Innovators
In Section 2 it was concluded that if we were to be able to model
the functional locus of innovation as a function of the appropriability
of innovation benefit by innovators, real-world conditions must resemble
Case 2: That is, innovators should be able to capture what I termed
output-embodied benefit related to these innovations but not be able to
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capture diffusion-of-knowledge benefit effectively and furthermore
should differ in their ability to capture output-embodied benefit. In
the following three sections I will assess what is currently known about
the mechanisms which an innovator might hope to use to capture these two
categories of benefit. I begin by examining mechanisms related to the
capture of diffusion-of-knowledge benefit.
While many market-based mechanisms such as lead time are used by
innovators in the United States today to capture output-embodied benefit
from their innovations, such mechanisms do not afford an innovator any
way to compel imitators to remit diffusion-of-knowledge benefit -- and
without coercion a profit-seeking imitator cannot be expected to make
such payments. Only two benefit capture mechanisms currently exist in
the United States which allow innovators the possibility of legally
compelling imitators to pay diffusion-of-knowledge benefit. These are
patent legislation (Federal) and trade secret legislation (State), and
the effectiveness of each in allowing the capture of diffusion-of-
knowledge benefit by innovators will be discussed below. The utility of
these mechanisms in capturing output-embodied innovation will be
discussed in Section 4.2.
3.1 Patent Legislation as a Diffusion-of-Knowledge Benefit Capture
Mechanism
A patent grants an inventor the right to exclude others from the
use of his invention for a limited period. In return for the right to
exclude not only those who copy the original invention but also those
who independently discover the same thing, the inventor must disclose
the invention to the public at the time of the patent's issue. This
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disclosure, contained in the patent itself, must be sufficiently
detailed so that those "ordinarily skilled in the art" may copy and
utilize the invention after the patent's expiration. While considerable
information exists on the number of patents acquired by various firms
and industries over time and on the various correlations between such
"patent rates", firm size, R&D expenditures, and similar variables, very
little information exists on the real-world effect of a patent grant on
an inventor's ability to gain diffusion-of-knowledge benefit from his
invention (20). In this section I will examine the studies with
empirical data on this matter and some additional evidence to this end.
Evidence of a patent system's effectiveness as a mechanism for the
capture of diffusion-of-knowledge benefit and/or output-embodied benefit
can be seen in its effect on an innovator's willingness to invest in
research and development while evidence of its effectiveness in
diffusion-of-knowledge benefit capture only can be seen via data on
license agreements and related payments. A recent study by Taylor and
Silberston (21) provides both types of evidence. Taylor and Silberston
examined the impact of British and foreign patents on a sample of 44
British and multinational firms involved in five broad "classes" of
industrial activity: chemicals (including pharmaceuticals and
petrochemicals); oil refining; electrical engineering (including
electronics); mechanical engineering; and man-made fibers. According to
the authors, "the classes chosen include most of those which invest
heavily in organized research and development with the exception of
aircraft, where the Government makes a dominant contribution to the
financing of these activities."
Approximately 150 firms were invited to join the study. Coded as
being in one of the five specified classes, they were selected from a
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"comprehensive list of U.K. quoted companies" on the basis of their net
assets in 1960: In each class all companies showing net assets in
excess of 10 million pounds in 1960 were selected, and every seventh
company of the remainder was selected from a list tabulated in ascending
order of net assets in 1960.* Finally, "some additions were made to
take account of mergers and acquisitions and to include unquoted
companies." Eventually "just over 100" firms responded to the letter of
invitation. Sixty-five expressed interest, but "some twenty of these
indicated that patents were a very minor aspect of their operations and
were firmly believed to have no significance on the business.... this
left 44 firms which agreed to participate in the inquiry." (22) Of
these, 30 ultimately agreed to participate fully and fill out the
detailed questionnaires provided by the authors, while the remaining 14
agreed to provide more limited information and to be interviewed.
As noted earlier, one measure of the diffusion-of-knowledge and/or
output-embodied benefit capture a patent system provides is the impact
it has on an innovator's willingness to incur R&D expenditures. Taylor
and Silberston's questionnaire addressed this issue by asking:
"Approximately what proportion of your R&D in recent years would not
have been carried out if you had not been able to patent any resulting
discoveries?" (23) This question appeared in a portion of the
questionnaire (Form B) which was filled out by respondents during
* The portion of this selection procedure which mandated inclusion of
all companies with net assets above 10 million pounds presumably
biased the sample toward larger companies. In contrast, the inclusion
of "unquoted companies" presumably introduced a bias toward small
companies. The study did not provide data to allow us to determine
the actual net bias of the sample on this variable.
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interviews with the authors, thus ensuring that the question was clearly
understood. The data derived from this question are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS OF R&D EXPENDITURE DEPENDENT
ON PATENT PROTECTION: TWENTY-SEVEN RESPONDING COMPANIESa
Estimate of R&D Affectedb
Very Little
None or (less than
Industry Negligible 5%)
Some Substantial Total
(5-20%) (over 20%) Returns
Number of Returns
Chemicals:
Finished and specialty
Basic
Total chemicals
Mechanical engineering
Man-made fibers
Electrical engineering
Total
Percentage of returns
1
1
2
7
'1
7
17
53%
2
2
4
1
1
1
7
22%
8
4
12.
10
2
8
1
1
2
0
0
0
2
6%
0
4
2
0
0
6
19%
32C
100%
a Table redrawn from Taylor and Silberston (21), Table 9.1, p. 107.
b Percentages refer to the estimated reduction in annual R&D
expenditure in recent years that would have been experienced, had
patent monopolies not been available.
c Some companies made returns for more than one activity.
--
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Note that 24 of the 32 returns indicate that a maximum of 5% of recent
R&D expenditures would not have been undertaken if patent protection had
not been available. This is especially striking since Taylor and
Silberston note that "in cases where a large area of uncertainty remained
[as to the proper answer to the question at issue] it was usually
possible to agree [with interviewees] on a reasonable mximum figure, and
since our object in this as in the other key questions on Form B was to
avoid understating the impact of patents, the benefit of the doubt in
such cases was given to those who seemed to us to be erring on the high
side in their assessments. For that reason, our findings are likely if
anything to exaggerate rather than minimize effects." (24)
A direct measure of the diffusion-of-knowledge benefit afforded to
innovators by patents may be obtained by looking at licensing cost and
benefit data. To the extent that an effective patent monopoly is
provided to an innovator, he might choose to exercise it by a policy of:
(1) excluding all competitors; (2) selectively licensing some applicants;
(3) licensing all applicants for a royalty and/or other consideration.
If the innovator chooses to reap diffusion-of-knowledge benefit from his
patent monopoly by use of policy option (3), licensing all comers,
diffusion of the innovation may be assumed to freely occur, and the
maximum value of diffusion-of-knowledge benefit capturable by the
innovator via the patent mechanism can be approximately represented by
licensing fees and/or other considerations received minus patenting and
licensing costs incurred by the innovating firm. In the event, most
firms studied by Taylor and Silberston claimed to be following policy
option (3), a policy of licensing all "responsible" applicants, rather
than options (1) or (2). Indeed, the authors note, "we were repeatedly
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assured that the main problem for the licensing department is to interest
reputable firms in taking licenses rather than dissuading them from doing
so, and many licensing specialists to whom we talked were plainly puzzled
that their task might be seen in the latter rather than the former
light." (25) Patent related cost and benefit data provided by Taylor and
Silberston's "main sample" of 30 firms will be found summarized in Table
2.
Taken together, Table 1 and 2 data suggest that, except in the
pharmaceutical field (for particular reasons noted on page 23 below),
firms do not find the patent grant to be of significant benefit. This
finding has emerged in the face of three study elements which would tend
to raise the level of benefit shown: (1) The authors noted in their
discussion of sample selection that firms which did not feel that patents
significantly affected them tended (preferentially?) to decline to join
A study performed by a group of candidates for the Master's Degree at
Harvard Business School (26), also contains some information on the
value of patents to firms which hold them. A questionnaire was pilot
tested, modified, and then sent out to a sample of 266 firms known to
hold a relatively large number of patents. (27) Sixty-nine of the
questionnaires (26%) were completed and returned in time to be
included in the study's analysis phase. All but four of these
respondents held more than 100 patents and collectively they "held
approximately 45,500 patents, or about 13.5% of all the unexpired U.S.
patents held by domestic corporations at the end of 1956." (28)
One of the questions attempted to determine the importance of patents
to firms by asking the "executive responsible for technical change" to
"please state briefly the importance of patents to the company".
Thirty-seven responded in a manner which the students felt they would
clearly categorize as follows: "very important" (8); "some
importance" (14); "not very important" (15). (29) While,
unfortunately, neither the question nor the coding categories used are
clear on what interviewers or interviewees meant by "important", we
find the results suggestive in light of the Taylor and Silberston
data: 40 percent of a sample of interviewees from companies selected
because they patent a great deal felt that patents are "not very
important to their companies".
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the study sample; (2) the authors noted that they chose to "err on the
high side" in their acquisition of data for Table 1; (3) the authors also
noted that the license agreements which resulted in the costs and
benefits shown in Table 2 involved the transfer of and payment for
valuable unpatented "know-how" in addition to the transfer of information
protected by patents and that "this may result in some overstatement of
the true payment for patent licenses themselves". Note, however, that
some understatement of real benefits may also be present because
remissions of any non-monetary benefits (e.g., cross-licensing) are
omitted from T3ble 2. (30)
Another study whose data can be used to assess the possible
diffusion-of-knowledge benefits that corporations reap through licensing
of their patents was conducted by Wilson (31), who reports data on
royalty payments submitted by some U.S. corporations to the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1971 on Form 10K. In that year
firms were required to report such payments if they were "material" with
the precise interpretation of that term being left up to individual
firms. Focusing on the Fortune listing of the 1000 largest manufacturing
corporations in 1971, Wilson found that 518 had considered their royalty
receipts "material" enough to report to the SEC. Since he was interested
only in royalty payments for "technology licenses ', he used various means
to detect and winnow from the sample firms which reported royalty
payments for such things as trademarks, copyrights, and mineral rights.(32)
The end result of this process was a sample of 350 royalty figures for
1971 which Wilson felt were largely or entirely payments for "technical
agreements", a term he doe.s not define, but which presumably includes
both patent and technical know-how-related payments. The responses of
18
these 350 firms were then aggregated under appropriate "2 and 3 digit SIC
codes" (not given) and displayed in tabular form.* The reader will find
Wilson's data for the SIC categories apparently most similar to the
"industrial activity classes" examined by Taylor and Silberston compared
in Table 3.
Even though derived from a different source and country, the Wilson
data have magnitudes quite similar to the Taylor and Silberston data and
this may serve to increase our confidence in the latter. While
unfortunately the Table 2 data are for royalty payments rather than
receipts (the Wilson data providing information on payments only), it is
likely that the bulk of technical agreements would be between firms in
**
the same industry. If so, it would follow that the low magnitude of
royalty payments in the Wilson data implies that royalty receipts would
also be found low in the industries sampled. This would be in line with
the Taylor and Silberston data indicating that the diffusion-of-knowledge
benefit captured by innovators is indeed low in most industries.
* Wilson used the 350 reports of corporate royalty payments to develop
estimates of royalty payments to all members of the industries he
studied, and then compared these estimates to industry-level data on
corporate R&D expenditures collected by the National Science
Foundation. As I find Wilson's estimating procedures inappropriate
for purposes herein, I use only the direct company report data he
provides.
**
This point is never explicitly examined, but is apparently assumed in
Taylor and Silberston (21). See especially the in-depth studies of
Pharmaceuticals, Basic Chemicals, and Electronics in that source.
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Table 3
WILSON AND TAYLOR - SILBERSTON ROYALTY PAYMENT DATA COMPARED
Wilson (31)
(1971 U.S. Data)
Taylor and Silberston (21)
(1968 U.K. Data)
Industry % of U.S. Sales
by Firms in
Sampl e
Royalties Paid
as % of Firm
1971 Salesa
Royalies Paid
as % of Fm
1968 Sales
"Industrial
Activity"
Chemicals
- Industrial
- Drug
- Other
Machinery
Electrical
76.4%
72.8%
51.4%
40.2%
40.5%
.244%
.745%
.034%
.051%
·042%
.635%
.044%
.255%
.1 82 %.13%
Chemicals
- Basic
- Pharmaceuticals
- Other finished
and specialty
Mechanical
Engineering
Electrical
Engineering
aSource: Wilson (31), Table 12, p. 169: Note that the data presented
here are computed from Wilson's sample of 350 royalty reports, not
bhis larger sample comprised of these reports plus estimated data.
Source: Royalty and license fee expenditures data from Taylor and
Silberston (21), Table 8.7, Col. 3, p. 164, sales data from Table
8. 1, col. 4, p. 145. (Petrochemicals have been removed from the
basic chemicals category of Table 8.1 to make this category
compatible with the equivalent category of Table 8.7.)
The slim data base I have just reviewed indicates that, in industry
aggregate terms, innovators do not capture much diffusion-of-knowledge
benefit via the patent mechanism. Are these data congruent with "tests
of reason" which one can apply to the matter? Let us explore. First,
does it make economic sense that firms would take out patents if these do
not, on average, yield much economic benefit? The answer is yes --
because the cost of applying for patents is also low. The cost of the
- -- --
--
-
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average patent application prosecuted by a corporation is on the order of
$5,000 today. (Even this small cost is often not very visible to
corporate personnel deciding on a patent application "purchase" because
it is typically subsumed within the overall cost of operating a corporate
patent department.)
Second, what do we know about the nature of the patent grant and of
the real-world workings of the patent office and the courts? And, is it
reasonable in the light of what is known to conclude that the patent
grant is likely to offer little benefit to its holder? Consider the
following three points.
One, it is important to note that a patent, if valid, gives a
patentee the right to exclude others from using his invention, but it
does not give him the right to use it himself if such a use would
infringe the patents of others. For example, Fairchild has a patent on
the so-called planar process, an important process invention used in the
manufacture of integrated circuits. If Firm B invents and patents an
improvement on that process, it may not use its improvement invention
without licensing the planar process from Fairchild and Fairchild may not
use the improvement either without licensing it from Firm B. Thus, in
rapidly developing technologies where many patents have been issued and
have not yet expired, it is likely that any new patent cannot be
exercised without infringing the claims of numerous other extant patents.
Given this eventuality, the benefit of a particular patent to an inventor
In 1961 the Commissioner of Patents reported the cost of an average
patent application prosecuted by a corporation to be $1,000 to $2,500,
and the cost of a single application prosecuted by an attorney for an
individual to be $680. (33) My own recent conversations with several
corporate patent attorneys yielded an estimate that the "average
patent application prosecuted by a corporation" currently costs on the
order of $5,000.
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would very probably be diminished because he might be prevented from
using his own invention or he might be forced to cross-license
competitors holding related patents in order to practice his invention.
Two, the patent system places the burden on the patentee of
detecting an infringer and suing for redress. Such suits are
notoriously long and expensive and both defendants and plaintiffs tend
to avoid them assiduously. For the defendant the best outcome in
recompense for all his time and expense is judicial sanction to continue
his alleged infringement, while the worst outcome would involve the
payment of possibly considerable penalties. For the plaintiff the
likelihood that a patent will be held valid and infringed by a court --
as opposed to invalid and/or not infringed -- is on the order of one to
three. (34) If a patentee has licensees already signed up for a patent
at issue, he has a high incentive to avoid litigation: If he loses, and
the odds are that he will, he loses payments from all licensees, not
just the potential payments from the particular infringer sued.
Three, the patent grant covers a particular means of achieving a
given end but not the end itself, even if the end and perhaps the market
it identifies are also novel. Thus, Land could not patent the concept
of or market for instant photography, but only any and all means to that
end which he could invent. Often, demonstration that an end can be
achieved and that there is a potential market for products achieving it
is very valuable information for potential competitors. Yet, as noted,
such information can only be protected indirectly via patent if the
inventive means described in the patent cannot be "invented around". In
the instance of the Polaroid and Xerography processes and a few other
notable cases, determined competitors could not, in fact, "invent
around" the means patented by the inventor. In most instances and in
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most fields, however, inventing around is relatively easy because there
are many known means by which one might achieve an effect equivalent to
the patented one, given the incentive to do so. Where inventing around
is possible, the practical effect is to make the upper bound value of an
inventor's patent grant equal to the estimated cost to a potential
licensee of such inventing around.
Taken in combination, the observations made above may be applied to
provide a very reasonable explanation for the relatively low benefit
which we have found innovators in most fields obtaining via the patent
grant. As an example, consider their application to the value of
patents obtained in the field of semiconductor electronics.
The semiconductor field is currently a very fast-moving one in
which many unexpired patents exist which address closely related subject
matter. The possible consequence -- confirmed as actual by corporate
patent attorneys for several U.S. semiconductor firms whom I interviewed
-- is that many patentees are unable to use their own inventions without
the likelihood of infringing the patents of others. Since patents
challenged in court are unlikely to be held valid, the result of the
high likelihood of infringement accompanying use of one's own patented
- or unpatented - technology is not paralysis of the field: Rather,
firms will in most instances simply ignore the possibility that their
activities might be infringing the patents of others. The result is
what Taylor and Silberston's interviewees in the electronic components
field termed "a jungle", (35) and what one of my interviewees termed a
"Mexican Standoff". Firm A's corporate patent department will wait to
be notified by attorneys from Firm B that it is suspected that A's
activities are infringing B's patents. Since possible germane patents
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and their associated claims are so numerous, it is in practice usually
impossible for Firm A -- or Firm B - to evaluate Firm B's claims on
their merits. Firm A therefore responds -- and this is the true
defensive value of patents in the industry -- by sending Firm B copies
of "a pound or two" of its possible germane patents with the suggestion
that, while it is quite sure it is not infringing B, its examination
shows that B is in fact probably infringing A The usual result is
cross-licensing with a modest fee possibly being paid by one side or the
other. Who pays, it is important to note, is determined at least as
much by the contenders' relative willingness to pay to avoid the expense
and bother of a court fight as it is by the merits of the particular
case.
Thus, in the semiconductor field, except for a very few patent
packages which have been litigated, which have been held valid, and
which most firms license without protest -- notably the Bell transistor
patents and the Fairchild planar process patents -- the patent grant is
worth very little to inventors who obtain it. Indeed, the one value
suggested to us -- defense against the infringement suits of others --
suggests that perhaps the true net value of the patent system to firms
in the semiconductor industry is negative because it requires all to
assume the overhead burden of defensive patenting.
In sharp contrast to the situation pertaining in most other industries
and the electronics field in particular, the patent grant seems to
confer significant benefit to innovators in the pharmaceutical field,
as indicated by the Taylor - Silberston and Wilson data discussed in
Tables 1 and 2. My own discussions with corporate patent attorneys
working for pharmaceutical firms brought out two likely reasons: (1)
Unusually "strong" patents are obtainable in the chemical field, of
which pharmaceuticals is a part, and (2) it is often difficult to
"invent around" a pharmaceutical patent. Pharmaceutical patents can
be unusually strong because one may patent an actual molecule found to
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In sum, we see both via data and test of reason that the patent
grant does not effectively enable innovators to capture diffusion-of-
knowledge benefit in most fields.
3.2 Trade Secret Legislation as a Diffusion-of-Knowledge Benefit
Capture Mechanism
Trade secrets, also sometimes termed "know-how", typically refer to
inventions and/or knowledge which can be kept secret even after
development is completed and commercial exploitation begun. The
possessor of a trade secret has an indefinite period of exclusive use of
his invention or discovery. Trade secret legislation allows him to keep
the information entirely secret or to make legally binding contracts
with others in which the secret is revealed in exchange for a fee or
other consideration and a commitment to keep the information secret. A
(continued)
have useful medical properties and its analogs (in contrast to only
the particular means to a given end in other fields). One need not
make each analog claimed, but can simply refer to lists of recognized
functional equivalents for each canomponent of the molecule at issue.
For example, if a molecule has ten important component parts, one
patent application might claim X plus 10 recognized functional
equivalents of X for each part. Obviously, by this means an inventor
may claim millions of specific molecules without actually having to
synthesize more than a few. Furthermore, demonstration that any of
the analogs so claimed does not display the medical properties
claimed does not invalidate the patent.
Pharmaceutical patents are difficult to "invent around" because the
mechanisms by which pharmaceuticals achieve their medical effects are
usually not well understood. Thus, would-be imitators do not gain
much insight by examining a competitor's patented molecule proven to
produce a desired medical effort. Eloquent testimony to this fact is
provided by the pharmaceutical industry's research practice of
synthesizing great numbers of molecules and "screening" these for
possible medical activity rather than synthesizing only a few
molecules predicted to have a given activity: The knowledge required
for such prediction is seldom available today.
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trade secret possessor may take legal steps to prevent its use by others
if they can be shown to have discovered the secret through unfair and
dishonest means such as theft or breach of a contract promising to keep
it secret.
A legally protectable monopoly of indefinite duration is obviously
a very attractive mechanism for capturing diffusion-of-knowledge benefit
since it would allow innovators the possibility of legally compelling
imitators to pay such benefits. It is, however, an option only for
innovations which can in fact be kept secret since the holder of a trade
secret cannot exclude anyone who independently discovers it or who
legally acquires the secret by such means as accidental disclosure or
*
"reverse engineering". In practice, trade secrets have proven to be
effective only with regard to product innovations incorporating various
technological barriers to analysis or with regard to many process
innovations.
There are, in the first instance, certain innovations embodied in
products which, while sold in the open market and thus available for
detailed inspection by would-be imitators, manage nevertheless to defy
analysis for some technological reason and which cannot therefore be
reverse engineered. Complex chemical formulations sometimes fall into
this category, the classic case being the formula for Coca-Cola. Such
barriers to analysis need not be inherent in the product -- they can
sometimes be added on by design. Thus, some electronic products can be
protected from analysis via use of a packaging method ("potting") and
In fact, if the secret is patentable, and if a later discoverer takes
out a patent, the trade secret holder may be excluded from using his
own invention.
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packaging materials which cannot be removed without destroying the
proprietary circuit contained within. (36) Methods for protecting trade
secrets embodied in products accessible to competitors need not be
foolproof to be effective -- they simply have to raise enough of a
barrier in a given case to create an unattractive cost benefit equation
for would-be imitators in that case.
In the second instance, process innovations such as novel catalysts
or process equipment can be protected effectively as trade secrets,
whether or not they could be "reversed engineered" by a would-be
imitator allowed to examine them, simply because they can be shielded
from such examination behind factory walls.
Little empirical data exist on the information protected as trade
secrets: There is no central registry for such material analogous to
the U.S. Patent Office, and even those trade secrets which are revealed
to others in exchange for diffusion-of-knowledge benefit, the subset of
interest to us here, are contained in private contracts which do not
usually appear on any public record unless litigated. (37) While some
examples exist of major diffusion-of-knowledge benefit being reaped by
innovators via licensing of trade secrets (38), I argue that the typical
effectiveness of this mechanism is severely limited for two reasons.
First, the mechanism is clearly not applicable to product or process
innovations which are not concealable behind factory walls and which are
amenable to reverse engineering if accessible to inspection by imitators
-- and these considerations apply to many industries and many
innovations. Second, a trade secret licensor can only gain redress
under trade secret legislation if he can document the specific illegal
act which diffused his innovation to unlicensed parties. A licensor
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will find such specificity difficult to achieve if he seeks to license
and reap diffusion-of-knowledge benefit from many licensees.
In sum, the preceding review of the two mechanisms currently
available to innovators by which they might hope to capture
diffusion-of-knowledge benefit from their innovations suggests that:
(1) most innovators do not obtain significant diffusion-of-knowledge
benefits via patents in most industries; and (2) obtaining
diffusion-of-knowledge benefits via the licensing of trade secrets is
possible, but only via carefully controlled licensing of those few
innovations which can, in fact, be kept secret.
4.0 Real-World Appropriability of Output-Embodied Innovation Benefit by
Innovators
If, as was evidenced in the last section, an innovator's ability to
appropriate diffusion-of-knowledge benefit is low in most industries,
his economic reward must primarily come from his ability to appropriate
output-embodied benefit. The logical necessity of this conclusion is
clear -- the two categories of economic benefit are mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive.
The ability of an innovator or innovating firm to capture
output-embodied benefit from an innovation derives from the ability to
establish a quasi-monopoly position with respect to that innovation. I
propose that two "levels" of quasi-monopoly are germane:
- quasi-monopoly which an innovation affords to the entire industry
of which the innovator is a member, and a portion of which the
innovator derives in accordance to his "size";
- quasi-monopoly which an innovation affords to the single
innovating firm relative to other members of his industry.
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The ability to capture output-embodied benefit which these two levels of
quasi-monopoly afford to firms is additive. I examine each, and the
mechanisms by which each is achieved below. While related empirical data
are also explored in this section, I have found it to be so sparse on the
issues addressed that the findings can best be seen as suggestive.
Research approaches used, on the other hand, offer useful models for the
additional empirical work required.
4.1 Output-Embodied Innovation Appropriable by an Innovating Firm via
Creation of an Industrywide Quasi-Monopoly
I define an industry as made up of all firms making products which
are close substitutes (i.e., have high cross-elasticity of demand).
Firms in an industry may share in an industrywide quasi-monopoly if
significant barriers exist which deter free entry to the industry by
additional firms. Examples of such barriers to industry entry are
specialized facilities, specialized production skills, and sales forces,
which are required for functioning effectively in an industry, which are
possessed by firms already in that industry, but which potential new
entrants must acquire.
Barriers to industry entry by new firms are common but difficult to
measure. Consider, as an example, the barriers which face a firm which
is a member of an industry characterized by a given functional
relationship to an innovation (e.g., an industry which uses semiconductor
process equipment to make semiconductors) and which wishes to join an
industry characterized by another functional relationship to that
innovation (e.g., the industry which manufactures semiconductor process
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equipment).* These two types of firms are really in very different
businesses. Each has a great deal of know-how, organizational
arrangements, and capital equipment which is quite specialized to build
its existing products and to serve its existing customer base. Thus, the
semiconductor manufacturer has a sales force which specializes in serving
semiconductor buyers. This force would be entirely inappropriate for
selling semiconductor process equipment: The customers are different,
the sales techniques are different (sample semiconductor devices can be
given out as a selling technique, but not samples of semiconductor
process equipment), and the specialized knowledge which the salesman must
have is completely different (a salesman with an electrical engineering
background can help customers with problems in selecting and using
semiconductor devices; a background in solid state physics would be
considerably more appropriate for a salesman trying to sell the
semiconductor process equipment used to grow the ultra pure single
silicon crystals used in semiconductor device manufacture).
If the sales, organizational, and production infrastructure which a
company uses to serve one functional role relationship to a given
innovation cannot effectively be used in the service of a different
Note that firms holding different functional relationships to a given
innovation are indeed in different industries according to the
definition of "industry" cited previously, and that it is important
to our model that barriers to entry exist between these industries.
This is so because if it were easy, for example, for an innovating
product manufacturer to become a product user at a moment's notice
should such a course-of action seem to promise an increased ability
to capture benefit from the innovation, we would only be able to
predict the functional locus of innovation in a weak sense, that is,
"the developer of X innovation will become a user" rather than able
to make the stronger statement that "the developer of X innovation
will be a firm and/or individual which currently is a member or the
user community".
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functional relationship, then it follows that a firm wishing to change
such relationships must also set up a new infrastructure appropriate to
this new role. Further, since the costs of the infrastructures of
competitors already having the role relationship the innovator wishes to
acquire are typically allocated across many products (e.g., a "line" of
process equipment or a "line" of semiconductor devices), the would-be new
entrant must develop/adopt/buy a similar line of product to sell if he
wishes to be economically competitive. All these requirements, I
suggest, represent significant barriers to industry entry.
Where significant barriers to industry entry do exist, an innovation
made by one member of the industry can establish an industry-level
quasi-monopoly with respect to that innovation which in turn can allow
the industry as a whole to increase its rate of profit and/or volume of
sales and thus reap output-embodied innovation benefit. As an example,
consider an innovation in plastics molding machinery made by a producer
of a commodity plastic such as polyethylene. Assume the innovation
allows molders of plastic items to significantly decrease their
production costs. Further assume, as is realistic, that the machinery
innovation itself cannot be protected effectively via patent or other
means by the innovator and that the machine works equally well using
It is important to note, however, that barriers to entry to a new
industry (barriers to adding a new functional role with respect to a
given innovation) may be considerably reduced if a firm does not want
to make a full-scale entry into a new industry but simply wants to
vertically integrate and only supply its own needs. Thus, if a
semiconductor process machine user wishes to build a few units of an
innovative process machine for in-house use, it does not need a sales
force, an external field service force, nor a full line of equipment
in order to spread the cost of these.
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polyethylene manufactured by any supplier of such. Under these
circumstances adoption of the innovation by molders might well increase
demand for polyethylene more rapidly than supply could respond (it takes
many years to build a new polyethylene plant) and the profits of all
polyethylene producers - molding innovation developer and other
producers alike -- might then rise in proportion to their market share
for polyethylene.
Further assumptions in this machine innovation example that the
innovator has no ability to control or benefit from the diffusion of
embodied knowledge regarding his innovation and that the innovation
benefit is assumed instantly distributed to all competitors currently in
the industry (i.e., the innovator has no lead time) are equivalent to
assuming the innovation to be a privately financed collective good. This
being the case, the conditions under which innovation will, or will not,
occur can be described in terms of Mancur Olson's "Theory of Collective
Action" (39) and his general argument applied to determining the locus of
innovation.
A collective good is generally defined in the economics literature
as one which, once made available to one member of a group, cannot
feasibly be withheld from others in that group whether or not such others
contribute to the cost of providing it. When a collective good such as
clean air, national defense, etc., is provided by a government to those
it governs, the government has the mechanism -- taxation -- and the
coercive power to insure that those who enjoy a collective good also help
pay for it, even though the good itself cannot be withheld in response to
nonpayment. When a group has no way of coercing its membership into
sharing in the cost of collective goods, each group member can be
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expected to act in accordance with his own private best interest in the
matter of paying, or not paying, for such goods.
Olson considers where the best (economic) interest of a group member
could be expected to lie when payment for goods collective to the group
is not coerced, and he reasons that a group member can justify paying for
a collective good only if the value to the member of that collective good
(Vi) exceeds the cost (C) of providing that good to the entire group. He
then reasons further that if that cost is a function of the level or rate
(T) at which the collective good is obtained (C=f(T)), and if the average
cost curves for a collective good have the conventional U shape, then the
optimum amount of good for the individual to provide is reached
d(V.-C)
when -- dT- = 0 (assuming the second-order conditions for a maximum
are also satisfied). On the basis of the above, Olson concludes that the
group member with the largest V is the one most likely to provide the
collective good because he has the most to gain from it. And when the
largest group member (L) has obtained the "amount" of te good he wants,
no smaller group member (S) will have an incentive to ccntribute
additional amounts because VS < VL by definition
d(V.-C)1
and therefore the point at which -- T--- 0 will occur sooner for
the smaller group member than it will for the larger. This conclusion
leads Olson to suggest that there is a tendency for smaller members of a
group to "exploit" the larger in terms in payment for collective goods.
A second result which may be derived from Olson's formulation is that a
group which does not compel its membership to share in the cost of
collective goods will tend to underinvest in such goods because the
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summed Vi of a collective good to all group members is necessarily
greater than VL of the largest group member.
The implication of the argument outlined above is that we should be
able to predict the identity of the innovator -- as well as whether there
will be innovation -- given the conditions specified under Case 2,
namely, economically rational would-be innovators, perfect information,
and the unimportance of the firm-level quasi-monopoly (discussed in a
later section) relative to the industry-level quasi-monopoly discussed
here. If we leave game theory considerations aside, we simply determine
who the "largest" group member is in terms of potential output-embodied
benefit arising from the innovation -- and he will be innovator.
(Without perfect information, any group member with output-embodied
benefit sufficient to bring the required investment above the "payback
hurdle" might choose to innovate.)
When and if industry-level quasi-monopolies do indeed provide
significant benefits to would-be innovators, we should be able to
empirically observe a concentration of innovations among what Olson terms
the "larger" group members (monopoly participants). Firms holding any
functional relationship to a given innovation are group members in
Olson's sense if their relationship allows them the possibility of
deriving output-embodied benefit from the innovation. (The qualitative
nature of the output in which the innovation benefit is embodied will
differ, of course, in accordance with the functional role relationship of
group member to innovation. For example, if the process equipment at
issue is a plastics molding machine capable of making parts more cheaply,
an equipment manufacturer's benefit is embodied in sales of the
innovative molding machine; a plastic supplier's benefit is embodied in
increased sales of plastic molding material.)
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At the moment the only study I am aware of which offers an empirical
research model which could test the potential significance of industry-
level quasi-monopolies via Olson's hypothesis is by von Hippel. (40) The
study focuses on semiconductor process machinery innovations developed by
firms that use such machinery in the manufacture of silicon-based
semiconductors and contains data on the market share ranking of
innovating user firms in the year in which their sampled process
machinery innovations were first used for commercial production of
*
silicon-based semiconductors. This market share data can serve as an
approximate measure of the relative amount of output-embodied innovation
benefit potentially appropriable by members of the sampled group of
innovating user firms if we adopt Olson's assumption that an innovation,
once made by any one group member, becomes a collective good instantly
provided to all members of that group. (Given this assumption, it is
reasonable to conclude that the pre-innovation market shares of all group
members whose outputs embody the innovation benefit will remain constant
post-innovation. And if this is so, we may usefully approximate group
member size by a group member's market share of silicon-based
semiconductors at the time of the innovation's first commercial use.)
The method by which market share data were acquired in the study is
fairly straightforward and is summarized in the notes to Table 4,
Only firms with a use relationship to the sampled innovations are
included in this study. Would-be innovators bearing other functional
relationships to those innovations such as semiconductor machinery
manufacturers, while also clearly in a position to gain output-embodied
innovation benefit and thus group members in Olson's sense, are
excluded. This exclusion has no practical consequence here since, for
reasons analogous to those spelled out in Section 5 for the pultrusion
industry study, it is quite certain that the "largest" group members
with respect to this innovation sample are innovation users.
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following. The method by which the sample of process machinery
innovations was selected and the identity of the innovating firm
determined was somewhat more complex. A subset of all process steps
involved in each type of manufacture of silicon-based semiconductors was
selected for study. (Process steps and innovations studied are
explicitly identified in von Hippel [41], Table 1.)
For each process step selected, the process machinery (if any) used
in the initial commercial practice of that step was identified and its
innovation history included in the sample. Next, all subsequent
improvements to process machinery for each step which offered a major
improvement in functional utility to the user of such machinery (judged
relative to previous best practice used in commercial manufacture) were
identified, and the innovation histories of these added to the sample.
Finally, an exhaustive list of process machinery innovations which
offered any increment in functional utility to the user was collected for
one randomly selected process step and these made up a sample of minor
improvement innovations. Note that only the first commercial
introduction of an innovation was included in the sample. Second and
subsequent "me-too" commercializations of the same innovation by other
manufacturing firms were excluded from the sample, as were second and
subsequent innovations in which the same functional result was attained
by a technical means different from that employed by the initially
commercialized version. Also note that all process equipment innovations
in the sample were successful in the sense of receiving widespread use in
their respective industries and becoming a commercially viable industrial
good, that is, manufactured for commercial sale by at least one (and
usually several) process equipment firms.
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Once I had identified the sample of innovations, I determined the
"source" of each via literature searches and interviews with user and
manufacturer personnel. An innovation "source" was the firm which
developed and built the first unit of equipment embodying the innovation
which was used to produce commercially sold semiconductors. Innovations
found to have a user source were coded as shown in Table 4.
In Table 4 I show the user firm sources of 20 semiconductor process
machinery innovations divided into the three previously defined
categories of "Initial", "Major", and "Minor". I also show, in column 3,
the market share rank of the innovating user firms in the year which the
innovation was first used. Finally, in column 4, I show the total number
of U.S. semiconductor manufacturers (semiconductor process machinery
users) extant in that same year. As the reader will note from a
comparison of these three columns, four out of the five innovating user
firms identified are ranked among the largest eight firms in terms of
share of market in the year of first commercial use of their
innovation(s). Since the probability that four out of five innovating
firms would be found in the top eight of 26 minimum extant firms is
p<0.05 if H is that the likelihood of user firm innovativeness is
independent of share of market ranking, Olson's hypothesis and the
existence of a significant industry-level quasi-monopoly are supported by
the study reviewed here. I emphasize, however, that the support of this
single study can only be seen as suggestive. Among the reasons: The
Firms coded NA in Table 4 were not smaller firms than those
specifically identified: rather, in these instances, several major
firms moved on the innovation so rapidly that I was were unable to
accurately determine retrospectively which of these had priority.
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study offers no information on the direction of causality involved in the
observed correlation between innovation rates and a firm's ability to
capture output-embodied benefit as measured by market share. More
empirical work will be required to address this and other data
uncertainties.
4.2 Output-Embodied Innovation Appropriable by an Innovating Firm via
Creation of a Firm-Level Quasi-Monopoly
I now move to a consideration of the mechanisms by which an
innovating firm might hope to establish a quasi-monopoly with respect to
all other firms, both current competitors and those currently outside the
industry, and thus be in a position to capture output-embodied innovation
benefit via increases in profit rates and/or sales volume. I suggest
that there are only three such mechanisms extant -- patents, trade
secrets, and "lead time", if we exclude from consideration those
comparative advantages one firm may have over another which, while they
may aid an innovator, are really innovation-independent and may equally
serve an imitator (e.g., a relatively favorable position with regard to
finances, mineral rights, marketing channels, firm reputation, etc.). We
will discuss each of these three extant mechanisms below.
As noted in Section 3.1, a patent grants an inventor the right to
exclude others from using his inventibn for a limited period in exchange
for public disclosure of that invention. The patent legislation requires
that this public disclosure be made at the time of the patent's issue and
be in sufficient detail so that others "ordinarily skilled in the art"
may readily imitate the invention, presumably upon the patent's
expiration. The result of the public disclosure is that interested
imitators have access to the invention and must be constrained by law,
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rather than by lack of knowledge,* from using it -- if the inventor is to
be able to use the patent grant as a mechanism for maintaining a
quasi-monopoly and garnering output-embodied benefit from his own
exploitation of the invention. But, as we have seen previously, the law
offers little effective protection to patent holders. The burden of
finding any infringement is on the patentee, no mean task, particularly
if the infringement does not involve a product sold on the open market
but rather a process or machinery invention which an infringer may
exploit and benefit from in the privacy of his factory. Moreover, the
burden of prosecuting the infringer also falls on the patentee. Such
prosecutions are notoriously long and expensive and studies of court
records (34) have shown that the likelihood of a patent being held valid
and infringed are on the order of three to one against the patent holder.
Thus, the same evidence that led me to conclude earlier that the patent
grant was not an effective mechanism for the capture of diffusion-of-
knowledge benefit also leads me to conclude that the patent grant is not
an effective mechanism for the capture of output-embodied innovation
benefit.
Trade secrets, a second possible means for the establishment of
innovation-based quasi-monopolies at the level of the firm, refer to
innovations which can be kept secret after development is completed and
* "Know-how" not revealed in a patent is often required to use an
invention effectively and for this reason patent licensing agreements
often require that related know-how also be transferred to the
licensee. This "know-how" is functionally equivalent to a trade
secret and will be considered under the discussion of trade secrets.
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commercial exploitation begun. As was explained in Section 3.2, secrecy
can be maintained during commercial exploitation either because (1) the
innovation cannot be "reverse engineered" and imitated even though
available to inspection by would-be imitators skilled in the relevant
analytical tools (the formula for Coca-Cola is the classic example of
such) or (2) the innovation, while susceptible to reverse engineering if
opened to the inspection of would-be imitators, can be hidden from such
inspection by some means (e.g., process equipment developed by users and
shielded within their own firm). As was noted earlier, essentially no
hard data exist on the effectiveness with which innovations kept as trade
secrets (sometimes also called "know-how") allows firms to establish
firm-level quasi-monopolies and capture output-embodied innovation
benefit. I am aware of two types of anecdotal data, however, which
suggest that know-how can sometimes be a very effective benefit capture
mechanism. First, many whom I have interviewed in corporations feel that
the mechanism is very effective for innovations which can in fact be kept
secret. (Logically, it is likely that the trade secret mechanism will be
more effective in allowing the capture of output-embodied innovation
benefit than in allowing the capture of diffusion-of-knowledge benefit,
as the latter use requires diffusion of the secret beyond the confines of
the innovator's factory while the former does not.) Second, in some
industries one can observe that firms incur significant expense to insure
that outsiders do not get the chance to inspect their production
equipment and/or techniques -- implying that these firms do regard the
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protected know-how as having significant economic value.* Clearly, more
research into the effectiveness of trade secrets would be valuable.
"Lead time," the third mechanism noted above, is the term commonly
used to describe the period starting when an innovator introduces a new
product to the market and ending when the first "me-too" product is
introduced by a competitor. Even if a would-be imitator becomes aware of
the innovation immediately when commercial exploitation begins -- as he
would if the innovation were a product sold in the open market rather
than, say, a process used by the innovator in-house -- the innovator will
enjoy some lead time simply because imitation takes time. During the
lead time period, an innovating firm by definition has a monopoly and is
in a position to capture output-embodied innovation benefit by increasing
his rate of profit and/or his market share. He may also seek to prolong
his lead time by adopting pricing strategies intended to forestall
imitation. (43)
I am aware of only one empirical study, Project Sappho (44), which
has touched on the correlation between lead time and project commercial
success. This study was conducted by a group of British researchers who
sought out a sample of 29 pairs of innovations (later expanded to 43
Interestingly, there is a wide variation in the amount of effort
firms exert to prevent inspection of their process know-how. In
some firms and industries access is denied even to repairmen wishing
to repair standard equipment located near proprietary equipment.
In other firms and industries I have observed a willingness to allow
free inspection of proprietary equipment and even a willingness to
encourage its commercial manufacture and sale by others. (40) Such
objectively codable differences in behavior may prove useful as one
research measure of the value of know-how.
pairs) members of which were not necessarily technically equivalent, but
which were equivalent in terms of the market and function they sought to
address. Of the 29 pairs, 12 were scientific instrument product
innovations such as the "Electromagnetic Blood Flowmeter", and the other
17 pairs were chemical process innovations, such as processes for the
synthesis of phenol. In the course of their data gathering the Sappho
researchers determined, among many other matters, which member of each
pair of products or processes came to market first, and also which member
of each pair was relatively the more commercially successful. These
results are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5
PROJECT SAPPHO COMPARISON OF INNOVATION LEAD TIME
AND INNOVATION COMMERCIAL SUCCESS
Same Intro- Success Failure
Innovation duction Date Earlier Earlier Probability
Chemical Processes
Sample Aa
Instrument Products
3
1
10 4
__________________
2 9
chi sq = 7.00
p = .01
Che ical Processes
Sample B
Instrument Products
5
2
11 6 chi sq = 2.78
7 12 p = .1
aSource: Achilladelis, et al. (45).
Source: Unpublished data (46).
From the Sappho data it would appear that the utility of lead time
to innovators is sometimes great enough to be discerned at the industry
level. In the specific industries examined lead time appears to be
associated with commercial success in the instance of chemical process
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innovations, and associated with commercial failure in the instance of
scientific instrument innovations.
Clearly more research on the value of lead time to innovators can
and should be conducted in a range of settings. If the value is indeed
significant in certain sectors, this should be possible to observe via
retrospective measures such as: (a) relative commercial success of
samples of "first-to-market" and "second-to-market" functionally
equivalent product pairs (the measure used by Sappho); (b) effect of
innovation on the relative market share of innovators -- and imitators --
in a product category (e.g., consumer goods); (c) questionnaire data from
firm executives as to whether it pays to innovate or imitate in a given
industry or product category.
The value of lead time to would-be innovators can be reasoned to be
a function of various situation-specific factors. One such factor is the
length of lead time divided by length of customer purchase decision
cycle. A high value on this factor favors the innovator over imitators.
Consider one extreme example: a consumer "fad" item (very short purchase
decision time) which sells in high volume for six months only. Assume
that the item can be readily imitated -- but can only be produced
economically by mass-production tooling requiring six months to build.
Obviously, lead time here allows the innovator to monopolize the entire
market. At another extreme is an expensive capital equipment innovation
-- which customers typically take two years to decide to buy, budget for,
In such instances the value of lead time to innovators is not
actually negative, of course. Rather, the positive value which lead
time offers the innovator is exceeded by the benefit to imitators.
Imitators can gain by having an innovator's product on the market
first in terms of such things as lessened R&D cost and more precise
data on market response. (See the discussion in the text of the
effect of "situation specific factors" on the value of lead time.)
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etc. -- and which competitors can imitate in one year. Obviously, lead
time in this instance affords an innovator little protection. Another
situation-specific factor involves the slope of learning curve. The
steeper the curve, the greater the production cost advantage an innovator
can accrue relative to potential imitators per unit of lead time enjoyed.
A third factor is the size and "indivisibility" of production plant
investment an innovation requires relative to market size. For example,
if DuPont uses lead time to invest in a special-purpose plant for the
production of Teflon which is large enough to supply any foreseeable
market expansion for several years ahead, incentives to imitate are
considerably reduced.
5.0 Differences in the Ability of Would-Be Innovators to Appropriate
Innovation Benefit
In Section 2 I concluded that it would be possible in theory to
model the functional locus of innovation in terms of the appropriability
of innovation benefit if would-be innovators: (1) Are not able to capture
diffusion-of-knowledge benefit; (2) are able to capture output-embodied
benefit arising from their innovations; and (3) differ significantly in
their ability to capture output-embodied innovation benefit. In Section
3 I concluded that the two mechanisms which an innovator might use to
capture diffusion-of-knowledge benefit (namely, patents and trade secret
legislation) are relatively ineffective, that would-be innovators in most
industries are therefore not able to capture diffusion-of-knowledge
benefit and that model condition 1 was thus satisfied. In Section 4 I
concluded that model condition 2 was satisfied on logical grounds: Since
would-be innovators can only appropriate economic benefit from their
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innovations by selling unembodied knowledge and/or output-embodied
knowledge, and since the former cannot be done effectively in most
industries, most innovators must appropriate economic benefit from
output-embodied knowledge if they appropriate such benefit at all. In
this section I proceed to a consideration of the third condition which
must be met if the functional locus of innovation is to be predicted in
terms of the appropriability of innovation benefit - presence of a
significant difference in the ability of would-be innovators having
different functional relationships to a given category of innovation to
capture output-embodied innovation benefit.
Clearly, a difference in the ability to would-be innovators of
capture output-embodied innovation benefit must be substantial if one is
to be able to predict the functional locus of innovation in terms of this
single variable. I will begin this section by describing a study which
"proves by example" that differences of the required magnitude can exist
in the real world and then will offer some tentative generalizations
regarding characteristics of industries likely to be associated with the
presence of such major differences.
5.1 Differences in the Ability to Capture Output-Embodied Innovation
Benefit: The Example
The first category of innovations which my students and I have
examined with an eye to assessing the differing ability of innovators to
capture output-embodied innovation benefit involves improvements in the
process machinery used for "pultrusion". While the economic importance
of this plastic fabrication process is still relatively small (only $60
million worth of "pultrusions" were produced in 1977), its use has grown
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at a real annual rate of 15-20% over the past ten years, and some experts
rank it second only to injection molding in terms of ultimate economic
importance in the production of fiber-reinforced plastics. (48)
Currently limited to the manufacture of fiber-reinforced products of
constant cross-section, the pultrusion process is used to fabricate such
products as the fiberglass-reinforced rod used by makers of fiberglass
fishing rods. In essence, the pultrusion process involves pulling
reinforcing material, usually fiberglass, simultaneously from a number of
supply rolls into a tank containing a liquid thermoset resin such as
polyester. The strands of reinforcement material emerge from the tank
thoroughly wetted with resin and then pass through "preforming tooling"
which aligns and compacts them into the desired cross-section. The
compacted bundle of glass and liquid resin is then pulled through a
heated die where the resin is cured and finally to a saw which cuts the
continuously formed product into sections of the desired length. The
entire pultrusion process is performed from start to finish on a single
integrated machine.
The basic pultrusion process was invented in the 1950s. Since that
time numerous important improvements have been made to the machinery,
resins, and reinforcement materials used and these were identified and
studied by William Lionetta in 1977. (49) In the portion of the study of
interest to us here, Lionetta, by dr'awing on his own professional
experience in the field of pultrusion and that of five other experts with
long experience in the field, identified a sample of thirteen process
machinery improvement innovations each of which was judged to offer the
machine user "a major increment in functional utility at the time of its
introduction when judged relative to best practice extant at that time".
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In some instances the innovation involved the development of equipment
unique to pultrusion. In other instances the innovation involved a first
application of equipment used in other industrial processes to the
pultrusion process. The "innovating" firm -- defined as the firm which
built the first unit of equipment embodying the innovation which was used
in commercial pultrusion production -- was then identified by a careful
search of contemporaneous literature and by interviews with user and
manufacturer personnel who were involved in or found to have knowledge of
each of the sampled innovations. The study concluded that the basic
pultrusion process itself and ten of the thirteen major process machinery
improvement innovations sampled were developed by machinery users and
three by a machinery manufacturer.
In addition to determining the locus of process machinery innovation
Lionetta examined the economics and structure of the U.S. pultrusion
machine user and pultrusion machine builder communities. He found
approximately 40 firms using pultruders in 1976, producing an aggregate
of $60 million worth of pultruded product, at an average price of $1.70
per pound and an average before tax profit of 12%. This product was
**
produced on approximately 150 pultrusion machines, each producing on
the order of 200,000 pounds of pultrusions annually. Approximately 120
This innovative machinery manufacturer, Goldsworthy Engineering, Inc.,
was also a user of pultrusion machinery at the time of the innovation
work. As part of a conservative stance toward the "user as innovator"
hypothesis being tested, however, this firm's innovations were coded
as machine builder developed.
Lionetta obtained estimates from experts which ranged from 87 to 200
extant pultrusion machines. Through computations based on average
machine capacities he developed an estimate of 176 machines.
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of these machines were found to have been "home-built" by the firms using
them and only 30 to have been built by the only commercial builder,
Goldsworthy Engineering, Inc. Pultrusion machine user firms were not
able to supply useful data on the actual costs of the machines they had
built over the years since they had often been built and rebuilt ad hoc
by production engineers. However, Lionetta was able to estimate on the
basis of data available on some recently built machines of "average"
capacity (a machine capable of pultruding product with a cross-section
of 6 by 7 inches) that a "homebuilt" machine of this capacity would have
direct cost of $50-60,000 in 1977, while an equivalent machine from the
sole commercial builder would have a purchase price of $75-85,000.
Actual sales of commercially built pultruders were reported by the
manufacturer to total four machines at an average price of $35,000 in the
years prior to 1967 and 26 machines at approximately $105,000 sales
price in the period from 1967 to 1977. Sales, therefore, of commercially
produced pultrusion equipment in the 1967-1977 period were on the order
of $270,000 per year. The manufacturer reported sales in this period to
be relatively flat despite the annual real increase in annual output of
pultruded product averaging 15-20%.
Due to an editorial error Lionetta calls this figure a cost when in
fact it is a purchase price. (50)
**
The difference between Lionetta's $75-85,000 price for a commercial
equivalent of an average homebuilt machine and Goldsworthy's average
sales price is the inclusion of an optional RF curing unit costing on
the order of $25,000 in many of the units sold by Goldsworthy but not
present on homebuilt machines.
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Lionetta's data can be used to construct a test of reason which
strongly supports the proposition that innovators (in this instance, the
users of process machinery in the pultrusion industry) have a much
greater ability to appropriate output-embodied benefit arising from their
innovations than do those in other functional relationships to the
innovation (in this instance, process machinery manufacturers).
Consider first the relative ability of pultrusion machinery
manufacturers and users to capture output-embodied innovation benefit via
the establishment of firm-level quasi-monopolies. The two mechanisms
which we found likely to be effective in the establishment of such
monopolies were lead time and trade secrets (know-how). In the instance
of pultrusion machinery process innovations it is clear that only user
innovators can hope to extend lead time much beyond the point at which
commercial use begins. This is so because pultrusion process machinery
innovations can be reverse engineered if inspected by would-be imitators
skilled in the art. And, while an innovating machine user can exploit
the innovation commercially while keeping it hidden from such inspection
behind his factory walls, an innovating machine builder must make the
innovative equipment available to the inspection of potential purchasers
if he is to reap output-embodied benefit from it. This in turn opens the
way to quick imitation. Two categories of trade secret are germane to
the process machinery innovations being considered here -- trade secrets
bearding on the use of the innovative equipment and trade secrets bearing
on its manufacturer. For reasons analogous to those spelled out above
that both machine builder and machine user have a similar capacity to
keep trade secrets regarding the manufacturer of innovative equipment,
and that both the single extant pultrusion equipment manufacturer and the
~~ ____ ~~I I _ I1_U_ __I __ I-· IY I I^~I- II-~_~I_------_
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larger users have similar occasion to develop such, as both build
pultrusion equipment on approximately the same scale.
Consider next the relative ability of pultrusion machinery
manufacturers and users to capture output-embodied innovation benefit via
the establishment of industry-level quasi-monopolies. Barriers to entry,
the mechanism which allows the establishment of an industry-level
quasi-monopoly, presumably provide some protection against new entrants
to both machine builders and machine users in the pultrusion field.
Lionetta's data shows, however, that the machine builder apparently is
unable to appropriate innovation-related output-embodied benefit as a
result of these barriers because, as noted earlier, users, although they
do not enter the commercial machine business, have proven themselves
capable of building machines to satisfy their in-house needs at a cost at
or below a machine builder's sales price which incorporates only a
"normal" profit margin. (User costs to build machines are presumably
lower than the machine builder's price for similar machines because the
former does not incur selling expense or add profit to his cost
calculations as the machine builder must. And in the pultrusion industry
the machine manufacturer does not make enough machines to offset these
extra costs via economy of scale savings.) In contrast, it is very
likely that users can appropriate output-embodied benefit via increase
profits and/or sales as a consequence of an innovation-related
industry-level quasi-monopoly. This is so because process machinery
innovations in pultrusion typically allow the pultrusion industry to
enter new markets at the expense of competing materials such as aluminum
by making it possible to manufacture new shapes via this method. Thus,
hollow product tooling, one of the innovations whose antecedents were
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examined by Lionetta, enabled pultrusion to be used to manufacture shapes
of hollow as well as solid cross-section. Similarly, the development of
improved "pulling" mechanisms, also examined by Lionetta, made it
possible to pultrude shapes of larger cross-sectional area than had been
possible previously.
Accordingly we may conclude that process machinery users in the
pultrusion industry have a much greater ability than machinery
manufacturers to appropriate output-embodied innovation benefit derived
from firm- and industry-level quasi-monopolies. We can illustrate this
discrepancy quantitatively via Lionetta's data which shows that an
additional pultrusion machine employed by a machine user will allow the
manufacture of 200,000 pounds of additional pultrusions annually. At the
1976 annual sales price of $1.70 per pound and pretax profit of 12% we
can see that such an additional volume will yield the machine user
$41,000 additional pretax profit annually.
In contrast, each extra machine sold by a machine builder as a
result of the innovations is worth only a one-time profit of $10,000 to
that firm at the prevailing machine price of $100,000 and pretax profit
rate of 10%. Thus, the machine builder would have to sell approximately
four additional units annually as a direct consequence of his innovation
in order to obtain an output-embodied innovation benefit equal to that
obtained by an innovating user who has embodied the innovation in only
one machine and sold an extra 200,000 pounds of product thereby. Such an
incremental volume on the part of the machine builder seems implausibly
high given the sales rate of 2.6 machines annually which that firm has
recorded over the past years. On the other hand, embodiment of the
innovation in only one machine seems an implausibly conservative estimate
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for the larger user firms since the top three firms in the field had more
than fifteen pultrusion machines each in 1978.
In sum, then, we propose that condition 3 holds in this instance.
That is, we have shown a strongly discrepant ability of firms holding
different functional relationships (user, manufacturer) to the same class
of innovations to capture output-embodied benefit from these. Further,
data on the locus of innovation in pultrusion is in accordance with what
we would predict if conditions 1, 2, and 3 of our single factor model are
met.
5.2 Towards Generalization
In the pultrusion industry I found that process machinery users and
process machinery manufacturers had sharply discrepant abilities to
appropriate output embodied innovation benefit from process machinery
innovations. I found, further, that the cause of this difference could
be logically attributed t mechanisms for the appropriation output
embodied innovation benefit identified and discussed earlier in this
paper. Specifically, I found that the pultrusion process machinery
manufacturer was not in a position to establish and benefit from an
industry-level quasi-monopoly with respect to process machinery
innovations ecause users could - and did - construct machines embodying
the innovations at a cost competitive with the manufacturer's price when
that price incorporated only a "normal" level of profit. In contrast, I
reasoned that users might well establish an industry level quasi-monopoly
and that this mechanism of benefit capture was therefore either
ineffective for both users and manufacturers or effective for users only.
Next, I found that pultrusion process machinery innovations could be
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reverse engineered if inspected by persons "skilled in the art". Since
only user innovators are in a position to appropriate output-embodied
benefit from their innovations while secreting them from inspection
within their factory walls, I concluded that user-innovators were more
favorably positioned than manufacturer-innovators with respect to
establishing and maintaining firm-level quasi-monopolies based on lead
time and trade secrets related to the use of a process machinery
innovation. In contrast, both users and manufacturers were found equally
favorably positioned with respect to establishing and maintaining
firm-level quasi-monopolies based on trade secrets related to the
construction of innovative process machinery.
Since most process machinery innovations can be reverse engineered
if inspected by someone skilled in the art -- and since most process
machinery can be constructed on ordinary metalworking machinery available
to would be innovators in all functional categories alike -- I propose
that our pultrusion industry findings are generalizable to most process
machinery innovations. That is, we may generally expect that all but one
mechanism for the capture of output-embodied innovation benefit will
favor the user - because only users can appropriate such benefit from
innovative process machinery while shielding the innovation from in-
spection by would-be imitators.* The sole mechanism not biased in
favor of the user is, as was noted earlier, firm-level quasi-monopoly
derived from trade secrets related to the construction of the process
machinery innovation. Experience curve data indicates that the relative
Note that there are exceptions to this user capability. For example,
users of construction machinery used in the open clearly cannot
shield innovations related to it "behind factory walls."
_____· I-1YI-ll-..-__.
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"amount" of this type of trade secret films will acquire is a function of
the relative number of machines they build. On the basis we may venture
the following economy-of-scale-related generalizations for all situations
where users and manufacturers are the functional groups most favorably
positioned to capture output-embodied innovation benefit. When manufac-
turers of a given category of process machinery can reasonably expect
to sell "many more" of a given process machinery innovation than any
single large user can utilize, then process machinery manufacturers will
be found to be the source of innovation in that category of process
machines. Otherwise users will be found to develop -- or pay for the
development -- of these. In a simple test of robustness of this
generalization I interviewed process engineers at a razor blade
manufacturer and a lamp manufacturer. In each instance the machine user
firm was found to have developed and built the highly specialized
equipment they required in house. (An example of such equipment in the
instance of the razor blade manufacturer was high-speed razor blade
sharpening machinery and, in the instance of the lamp manufacturer,
high-speed lamp assembly machinery.) Both firms, however, were found to
have purchased packaging machinery, used by many industries, from
packaging machinery manufacturing firms.
The above generalization can be extended to explain why the locus of
process machinery innovation might shift with time for some categories of
process machinery, but not display any such shift in others. Thus, the
shift observed by Knight (51) from development of innovative computer
hardware by users in the early days of that field to a later computer
manufacturer locus of innovation is explicable in these terms: In the
initial period computers were seen as special purpose machinery needed by
_Il_.·^II__Y__II.-11-_1_---1-
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only a few users such as the U.S. Census. As the industry developed,
however, it became apparent that computers had many uses and that there
was a market for many standard units. This increase in perceived market
size enlarged the perceived output-embodied innovation benefit appropriable
by computer manufacturers. Thus the empirically observed shift in the
locus of innovation is congruent with the single factor model. In contrast,
I would not expect the locus of innovation to shift from user to
manufacturer over time in the instance of razor blade sharpening
machinery since the market for such specialized machines has been small
in the past and will presumably remain so.
Although my own research to date on this variable has focused on the
costs and benefits of certain categories of process machinery innovation,
other categories of innovation look equally promising, and I would
encourage investigation into many such. As noted earlier, Berger (6)
and Boyden (7) have, for example, sampled plastics and plastics additive
innovations respectively and have found all of these to have been developed
by product manufacturers rather than product users. I suspect that further
research would show this locus explicable in terms of the ability of
users and manufacturers to appropriate output-embodied benefit from these
categories of innovations. A particular plastic or additive is typically
not essential to users since other materials exist which can do the job
at a (usually minor) cost premium. To the manufacturer, however,
a plastics and additive innovation which provides svch a slight cost
advantage may mean that major users of other materials (steel, aluminum,
other plastics, etc.) replace these with the innovative material and
quickly become major customers, thus allowing the innovator to capture
significant output-embodied benefit.
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In sum, I propose that the appropriability of output-embodied
innovation benefit is a variable which can usefully be incorporated in a
model of the locus of innovation. I also propose that in some categories
of innovation, not yet clearly delineated, the role of this variable in
determining the locus of innovation is a strong one.
·^___II 
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